



Algorithmic Control and Precarity in Gig Work Culture in India: A Sociological Review

Anindita Chatterjee

Guest Faculty, Department of Sociology, Women's Christian College, Kolkata.

Email: chatterjeeani.socio@gmail.com ORCID ID: 0009-0005-0083-2856

Abstract

The rapid expansion of gig work in India has transformed labour relations through digital platforms that organise work via algorithms rather than traditional managerial hierarchies. While gig work is often presented as flexible and autonomous, sociological research increasingly highlights the centrality of algorithmic control and precarity in shaping workers' lived experiences. This paper offers a qualitative secondary review of sociological, interdisciplinary, and policy-oriented literature to examine how algorithmic management practices – such as ratings, incentives, surveillance, and automated penalties – restructure labour control, and how these practices produce and normalise precarity in gig work culture in India. Drawing on key sociological frameworks, including labour process theory, Weberian rationalisation, Foucauldian discipline, precarity studies, manufacturing consent, and surveillance capitalism, the study situates platform labour within longer histories of informalisation and labour flexibilisation. The analysis shows that gig work in India represents a hybrid regime of digital control and social insecurity, reinforced by weak legal protections despite recent policy interventions. The paper argues that understanding gig work requires shifting attention from narratives of flexibility to questions of power, inequality, and justice in the algorithmic age.

Introduction

Gig work refers to forms of work where people earn their livelihood by completing short-term, task-based jobs, usually through digital platforms such as ride-hailing, food delivery, logistics, or home services apps. Workers are connected to customers through mobile applications rather than traditional workplaces. In India, gig work is most visible in sectors such as ride-hailing (Uber, Ola), food and grocery delivery (Swiggy, Zomato, Blinkit, Zepto), e-commerce logistics (Flipkart, Amazon), and app-based home and professional services (Urban Company); these platforms employ large numbers of workers on a task-based and on-demand basis, often without formal employment contracts ((Fairwork India Ratings, 2024). According to the *Fairwork India Ratings* (2024), workers across these sectors commonly face issues related to low and fluctuating pay, opaque algorithmic management, weak grievance redressal mechanisms, and limited access to social protection, highlighting the precarious nature of platform-mediated work in the Indian context (Fairwork India Ratings, 2024). Gig work is often presented as flexible and independent, allowing workers to choose when and how much they work. However, sociological research shows that platform-based work represents a major shift in how labour is organised and controlled, rather than simply a new form of freedom or entrepreneurship (Wood et al., 2019; ILO, 2021). A key concept used to understand gig work is *precarity*.



Guy Standing (2011) describes precarity as a condition in which workers face unstable income, insecure employment, lack of social protection, and limited control over their working lives. In gig work, precarity is especially strong because workers are officially treated as independent contractors, yet they depend heavily on digital platforms for access to work and income (Rosenblat & Stark, 2016). Earnings often fluctuate, benefits such as health insurance or paid leave are absent, and workers can lose access to work suddenly through deactivation or penalties imposed by algorithms (ILO, 2021). This insecurity is closely linked to algorithmic control. Instead of managers or supervisors, gig platforms use algorithms to assign tasks, monitor performance, evaluate behaviour, and impose rewards or penalties. Ratings, incentives, acceptance rates, and automated decisions play a central role in shaping how workers behave and how much they earn (Wood et al., 2019). Workers are constantly monitored, but they usually do not know how decisions are made or how algorithms work. This lack of transparency creates uncertainty and encourages workers to discipline themselves in order to avoid penalties or loss of work (Rosenblat & Stark, 2016).

Historically, gig work can be seen as part of a longer process of labour flexibilisation¹ linked to neoliberal economic reforms, outsourcing, and the expansion of informal work. In countries like India, gig work does not replace informality but reorganises it through digital platforms. Existing insecure work arrangements are reshaped by technology, often making insecurity more intense rather than reducing it (Rani & Furrer, 2021). As a result, gig work in India represents a hybrid system—digitally managed but socially and economically insecure.

From a legal perspective, India has taken some initial steps to recognise gig workers. The Code on Social Security, 2020 is the first national law to officially define “gig workers” and “platform workers.” The Code proposes social security measures such as insurance, health benefits, and old-age support. However, it does not recognise gig workers as employees, nor does it guarantee core labour rights like minimum wages, job security, or collective bargaining (NITI Aayog, 2022). Most of the promised schemes are also yet to be fully implemented. More recently, the state of Rajasthan took a significant step by passing the Rajasthan Platform-Based Gig Workers (Registration and Welfare) Act, 2023; this law introduces worker registration, a welfare board, and a platform-funded welfare fee aimed at providing social security benefits (Fairwork India Ratings, 2024). The Rajasthan case is important because it moves beyond recognition and attempts to create an institutional framework for worker protection. However, scholars note that its effectiveness will depend on implementation, enforcement, and whether similar measures are adopted by other states (ibid.).

Gig work in India cannot be understood simply as flexible or innovative employment. Instead, it reflects a deeper transformation of labour relations, where algorithmic control, precarity, and limited legal protection shape workers’ everyday experiences. A sociological approach, therefore, can help to shift attention from individual choice and technology alone to broader questions of power, inequality, and justice in the platform economy.

Review of Literature

Digital labour platforms have generated a growing body of sociological and interdisciplinary scholarship that examines how work is reorganised through algorithms rather than traditional managerial hierarchies.



This literature broadly argues that gig work is not simply characterised by flexibility and autonomy, but by a distinctive form of labour control embedded in platform design, data infrastructures, and automated decision-making systems (ILO, 2021; Wood et al., 2019). Within this framework, algorithms silently take on the role of managers by deciding who gets work, closely tracking performance, judging behaviour, and applying penalties, while giving the impression that workers remain independent and in control.

Algorithmic Systems and Labour Control in Platform Work:

A central theme in sociological studies of gig work is the concept of *algorithmic management*, where software rather than supervisors organises, evaluates, and disciplines labour (Wood, 2021). Platforms use ratings, incentives, surveillance, and automated penalties to shape worker behaviour, often in unequal and blurred ways (Rosenblat & Stark, 2016). Ratings are especially powerful because they shift day-to-day evaluation to customers while the platform controls the consequences. As Rosenblat and Stark (2016) show, workers treat ratings as implicit threats, carefully managing speed, politeness, and compliance to avoid fewer tasks or sudden deactivation. Since workers rarely know how ratings are calculated or reviewed, this lack of transparency produces constant uncertainty and self-monitoring, encouraging conformity to algorithmic expectations rather than direct managerial orders (Wood et al., 2019).

In addition to ratings, platforms employ incentive structures (such as bonuses, surge pricing, and task streaks) to direct worker behaviour. Sociological studies interpret these incentives as forms of “*gamified labour control*”, where economic rewards are used to insist workers into longer hours, higher intensity, and strategic availability (ibid.). While participation in such schemes is formally optional, empirical research suggests that declining base pay and income volatility often make incentive chasing economically necessary (Fairwork India Ratings, 2024). In the Indian context, *Fairwork* report on platform assessments reveal that incentive structures increasingly regulate not only how much workers earn, but also when and how long they work, thereby reshaping the meaning of “*flexibility*” (ibid.). This supports broader sociological arguments that algorithmic control operates subtly, through behavioural nudges rather than overt coercion.

Algorithmic management also relies heavily on continuous digital surveillance, including GPS tracking, task completion times, and communication monitoring. The ILO (2021) notes that such systems enable platforms to exercise detailed oversight while minimising accountability and worker participation. Surveillance data are frequently integrated into automated evaluation systems, allowing platforms to impose penalties—such as reduced visibility, incentive withdrawal, or account suspension—without human mediation. Automated penalties and deactivation have been conceptualised as “*accountability shocks*” that discipline workers while shielding platforms from direct responsibility (Wiener et al., 2023). In India, NITI Aayog (2022) highlights that gig workers classified as independent contractors face heightened vulnerability to such penalties, as grievance redressal mechanisms remain weak or inaccessible. Together, these studies show that algorithmic systems constitute a powerful mode of labour control that combines visibility, uncertainty, and unilateral authority.

Precarity and Lived Experience in Gig Work Culture:

Precarity in gig work refers to a condition of chronic insecurity in which workers experience unstable income, uncertain job continuity, limited social protection, and constant exposure to platform control through ratings, algorithms, and unilateral rule changes (Standing, 2011; Wood et al., 2019). Rosenblat and Stark (2016) show that behind the language of flexibility and entrepreneurship, gig platforms quietly manage workers through algorithms—using ratings, incentives, surveillance, and automated decisions rather than face-to-face supervision; For workers, this means living with constant uncertainty: earnings fluctuate, rules change without warning, and access to work can disappear suddenly through deactivation, often without explanation or appeal. In gig economies, precarity is intensified because workers are formally classified as independent yet remain structurally dependent on digital platforms for access to work (Yasih, 2025). Beyond mechanisms of control, sociological studies increasingly focus on how gig work culture shapes workers' everyday experiences of precarity. Precarity in platform labour is understood not only as unstable employment, but as a multidimensional condition involving income insecurity, psychological stress, dignity loss, and constrained agency (ILO, 2021).

A recurring finding across studies is that platforms systematically transfer economic risk to workers. Costs related to fuel, maintenance, waiting time, illness, and accidents are borne by workers, while platforms retain the ability to unilaterally alter pay algorithms and incentive rules (Wood et al., 2019). The ILO (2021) describes this as a defining feature of digital labour platforms, where fragmented task structures and mediated contracts intensify income volatility. Indian policy-oriented research similarly notes that gig workers often experience fluctuating earnings despite extended working hours, making financial planning difficult and reinforcing economic vulnerability (NITI Aayog, 2022). Precarity, therefore, emerges not as an accidental outcome, but as a structurally produced condition embedded in platform governance.

Although gig workers are formally designated as independent, empirical studies reveal high levels of dependence on one or two platforms for livelihood (Rosenblat & Stark, 2016; Wood et al., 2019; Fairwork India Rating, 2024). This creates a paradox of *autonomy without security*, where workers lack collective bargaining power while remaining vulnerable to sudden rule changes or deactivation (Fairwork India Rating, 2024). Such conditions contribute to chronic stress, particularly due to fear of penalties and uncertainty surrounding performance evaluation. Research on Indian ride-hailing platforms shows that workers develop practical knowledge of platform logics—learning how to interpret incentives, manage acceptance rates, and avoid sanctions—yet remain exposed to unpredictable algorithmic decisions (Sehrawat, 2021). This highlights how precarity is lived through constant calculation and adaptive labour, rather than passivity.

Several sociological studies frame gig work precarity as also involving struggles over dignity and recognition. Customer ratings, surveillance, and platform judgements often function as moral evaluations of workers, reinforcing feelings of disposability and disrespect (Wood et al., 2019). While platforms promise professionalism and status through app-based identities, workers may still experience stigma, suspicion, and everyday humiliation in public and customer-facing interactions (Wood et al., 2019; Rosenblat & Stark, 2016). In Global South contexts, these experiences intersect with existing class inequalities and informal labour



histories, producing a hybrid work culture that is digitally organised but socially insecure (ILO, 2021). Workers may value platform affiliation for its symbolic legitimacy, even as they confront intensified control and vulnerability.

Despite structural constraints, the literature consistently documents worker agency in the form of coping and resistance strategies. These include strategic compliance with algorithmic rules, multi-platform work, informal peer networks, and limited forms of collective action (NITI Aayog, 2022; Wood, 2021). However, the individualised and competitive design of platforms often restricts sustained collective organisation, reinforcing isolation and dependence. India-specific research highlights workers' everyday adaptations to algorithmic management. Studying ride-hailing platforms in India, Chakraborty and Heeks (2023) show that workers respond to platform management through coping, navigation, and tactical practices, indicating that precarity is lived through continuous calculation and adjustment rather than passive insecurity.

Recent policy commentary and parliamentary records show that *Raghav Chadha's* 2025–2026 interventions have focused on consumer welfare, gig-worker safety, and regulatory accountability as part of a wider debate on everyday economic governance in India. Media reports from January 2026 note Raghav Chadha's parliamentary criticism of ultra-fast "10-minute delivery" models, where he highlighted that such time pressures create intense, constant, and often dangerous stress for gig workers, affecting their safety, income security, and dignity and sparking widespread public debate on platform responsibility (India Today/NDTV, January 13–15, 2026). India Today (2026) reports, a Blinkit delivery worker spoke about the intense pressure created by the platform's highly publicised *10-minute delivery* promise during a conversation with Rajya Sabha MP Raghav Chadha. The exchange was shared in a teaser posted on Chadha's official X account in January, 2026, where he noted that he had spent a day working as a delivery agent to understand the everyday realities faced by gig workers. Related reports show his engagement with the lived conditions of delivery workers through symbolic immersion and public dialogue, framing gig work precarity as a policy concern rather than an individual failure (NDTV, 2025). Regulatory intervention in early 2026 saw the Indian government urging quick-commerce firms—including Blinkit, Zepto, and Swiggy—to drop their "*10-minute delivery*" branding amid concerns that such ultra-fast commitments were pressuring delivery workers to take unsafe risks on congested roads (Kalra, 2026; Thaker, 2026). The removal of 10-minute branding can be interpreted as a symbolic corrective, yet Economic Times highlight that on-the-ground pressures remain intense even without formal time guarantees, since workers still fear penalties or loss of income if they fail to deliver quickly (The Economic Times, 2026). Thus, news accounts of the quick-commerce adjustments in India serve as empirical illustrations of how platform norms—even where softened at the branding level—continue to shape workers' lived precarity. They show how regulatory and public responses interact with platform algorithmic pressures, reinforcing the need to analyse gig work not only as technological innovation but as a regime of labour governance with tangible consequences for worker safety, dignity, and economic vulnerability.

Overall, the literature converges on a key sociological insight: gig work culture in India is shaped by algorithmic control and institutional gaps, producing a durable condition of insecurity that workers must

continually manage through everyday strategies (Fairwork, 2024; ILO, 2021; NITI Aayog, 2022; Rosenblat & Stark, 2016).

Methodology

The present study is based on a qualitative secondary review of sociological and interdisciplinary literature on gig work in India. The review is guided by two objectives: (i) *to examine how algorithmic management practices—such as ratings, incentives, surveillance, and automated penalties—structure labour control in platform work*, and (ii) *to analyse how gig work culture produces and normalises precarity in workers' lived experiences, including income insecurity, job instability, stress, and dignity loss*. Secondary data were drawn from journal articles, books, and institutional reports published by sources such as the ILO, NITI Aayog, and Fairwork India. The selected literature was analysed thematically using key sociological frameworks.

Analysis & Discussion

This section analyses the reviewed literature through major sociological frameworks to interpret how algorithmic control reorganises labour power and how precarity is experienced, normalised, and contested within gig work culture. Rather than treating digital platforms as a technological novelty, sociological theory helps reveal them as new institutional forms of labour governance embedded in long-standing relations of power, inequality, and domination.

(a) *Algorithmic Control and the Labour Process: A Marxian Perspective:*

From a Marxian labour process perspective, algorithmic management can be understood as a contemporary mechanism for extracting *surplus value* (Marx, 1867/1976) while obscuring relations of exploitation. Classical labour process theory emphasised managerial control over workers' time, effort, and output. In gig platforms, this control is not exercised through supervisors but through algorithms that regulate work allocation, performance metrics, and sanctions. Following Karl Marx, the commodification of labour power in platform work is intensified by the fragmentation of tasks and the individualisation of employment relations. Workers sell discrete units of labour (rides, deliveries, tasks) rather than stable labour time, allowing platforms to externalise risks while maintaining control over the labour process. Algorithmic systems thus function as instruments of capital's domination over labour, even as platforms deny the existence of an employment relationship.

The literature shows that ratings, incentives, and deactivation mechanisms discipline workers into self-regulation, aligning their behaviour with productivity goals without direct coercion. This reflects what later labour process scholars describe as "*responsibilisation*"² (Rose, 1990;1999;2000)—workers are made accountable for outcomes shaped by opaque systems they do not control. In this sense, algorithmic control deepens exploitation by combining economic dependence with legal and institutional invisibility.

(b) Rationalisation and Bureaucracy Without Bureaucrats: Weberian Insights:

A Weberian perspective helps illuminate platform labour as an advanced form of *rationalisation*, where work is organised through calculability, predictability, and technical control rather than personal supervision (Weber, 1978). Gig platforms embody this logic by converting labour into measurable indicators such as ratings, acceptance rates, completion times, and performance scores, allowing work to be continuously evaluated and compared (Wood et al., 2019). Yet, unlike classical bureaucracies, platform governance is marked by limited transparency and weak procedural accountability. Workers are governed by rules and algorithms that they cannot fully access, interpret, or challenge, creating a system that resembles a form of “*bureaucracy without offices*” – rationalised, impersonal, and often arbitrary in its operation (Rosenblat & Stark, 2016).

In this digital reworking of Weber’s “*iron cage*” (Weber, 1978) control no longer depends on written rules or supervisors but on proprietary algorithms whose logic remains opaque to workers. Existing studies suggest that this form of governance generates persistent uncertainty and anxiety, as workers must continuously adjust their behaviour to shifting system expectations without the security of formal rights or institutional safeguards (Wood, 2021).

(c) Surveillance, Discipline, and Power: A Foucauldian Perspective:

The role of surveillance in gig work closely reflects Michel Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary power, where control operates through continuous observation rather than direct command (Foucault, 1977). Digital platforms routinely track workers’ locations, interactions, and performance through data traces, producing a condition of constant visibility. This visibility, however, is asymmetrical: workers are continuously monitored by the system, while the logic of the system itself remains largely opaque to them (Rosenblat & Stark, 2016).

Such algorithmic surveillance gives rise to *self-disciplining subjects* who aware that their actions are constantly recorded, rated, and evaluated, workers internalise platform norms and adjust their conduct accordingly, regulating speed, availability, and customer interaction without explicit supervision (Wood et al., 2019). Ratings systems further intensify this process by merging surveillance with moral judgement, transforming customer feedback into a powerful mechanism of social control (Rosenblat & Stark, 2016).

Punishment in gig work is often automated and immediate, taking the form of reduced task visibility, withdrawal of incentives, or sudden deactivation, with little scope for explanation or appeal (Wood, 2021). This shift signals a move from corrective discipline to *preventive governance*, where the ever-present threat of exclusion ensures compliance. Taken together, the literature supports a Foucauldian interpretation of platform power as diffuse, continuous, and embedded in everyday work practices rather than exercised through overt authority (Foucault, 1977; Wood et al., 2019).

(d) Precarity, Class, and the “New Dangerous Class”:

The concept of precarity has been most systematically developed by Guy Standing, who describes the *precariat* as a class-in-the-making marked by unstable employment, insecure income, and limited access to

social protection (Standing, 2011). Much of the literature on gig work aligns with this framework, particularly in documenting income volatility, absence of employment benefits, and workers' exposure to sudden algorithmic decisions such as incentive withdrawal or deactivation (Wood et al., 2019; ILO, 2021). However, sociological studies from India and the wider Global South complicate Standing's argument by showing that platform-based precarity intersects with long-standing histories of informal labour rather than emerging entirely anew. Research suggests that gig work does not create precarity from scratch; instead, it digitally reorganises existing informal work arrangements, often intensifying insecurity through algorithmic governance and weak institutional protection (Rani & Furrer, 2021; Yasih, 2025).

This perspective indicates that the precariat within platform economies is far from homogeneous. Social divisions such as class, caste, migration status, and urban inequality shape how insecurity is experienced, negotiated, and managed by workers (ILO, 2021). Gig work culture therefore reflects a layered class structure in which digital inclusion and app-based visibility coexist with persistent economic vulnerability, producing what may be described as a condition of *formalised informality* (Rani & Furrer, 2021).

(e) Consent, Consent Manufacturing, and Cultural Control:

Drawing on Michael Burawoy's theory of *manufacturing consent*, gig work culture can be understood as producing compliance not mainly through direct coercion, but through incentive systems, entrepreneurial narratives, and the promise of flexibility (Burawoy, 1979). Platforms routinely describe workers as "partners" or "independent earners," encouraging them to identify with platform objectives and internalise productivity goals rather than view themselves as managed labour (Wood et al., 2019).

Empirical studies show that incentive schemes, bonuses, and gamified rewards play a central role in sustaining consent even as base pay declines and work intensity increases (Wood et al., 2019; Fairwork, 2024). Workers may be aware of exploitative conditions, yet continue participating due to competitive pressures, future-oriented hope, and limited alternative employment options (Rosenblat & Stark, 2016). This cultural dimension of control helps explain why resistance in gig work remains fragmented and episodic, and why algorithmic domination often appears normalised and legitimate in everyday practice (Burawoy, 1979; Wood, 2021).

(f) Surveillance Capitalism and Data-Driven Control in Gig Work:

The dynamics of algorithmic control and precarity in gig work can be further understood through the lens of *surveillance capitalism*, a concept developed by Shoshana Zuboff to describe economic systems that extract value from continuous data capture and behavioural monitoring (Zuboff, 2019). In platform labour, workers' movements, response times, customer interactions, and performance metrics are constantly tracked and transformed into data that platforms use to predict, shape, and optimise behaviour. This data-driven governance aligns closely with gig workers' lived experience of permanent visibility and opaque evaluation, where control is exercised not through direct supervision but through algorithmic inference and behavioural nudging (Rosenblat & Stark, 2016; Wood et al., 2019).

Surveillance capitalism deepens precarity by converting workers' everyday activities into sources of value extraction while simultaneously exposing them to discipline, ranking, and exclusion. As Zuboff (2019) argues, such systems normalise asymmetrical power relations in which those being monitored have little knowledge of, or control over, how data are used. In the gig economy, this asymmetry reinforces economic dependence and insecurity: workers must constantly adapt to shifting algorithmic expectations without transparency, appeal, or collective voice. Surveillance capitalism therefore complements Marxian, Weberian, and Foucauldian readings of platform labour by highlighting how *data extraction itself becomes a central mechanism of domination*, making control continuous, predictive, and deeply embedded in everyday work practices.

Taken together, sociological theories reveal that gig work culture is not merely a response to technological innovation, but a *restructuring of labour power through digital means*. Algorithmic control reproduces classical dynamics of exploitation, discipline, and domination, while precarity becomes normalised through cultural narratives of flexibility and self-management. In Global South contexts like India, platform labour intensifies long-standing informal arrangements rather than replacing them, producing a hybrid regime of digital control and social insecurity. Sociological theory thus shifts the analysis away from individual choice and technological efficiency toward questions of power, inequality, and justice in the algorithmic age.

Conclusion

This review has shown that gig work culture is best understood not as a neutral outcome of technological innovation, but as a *reorganisation of labour power through algorithmic governance*. Drawing on major sociological approaches, the analysis demonstrates that platforms reproduce long-standing relations of exploitation, control, and inequality in new digital forms. From a Marxian labour process perspective, algorithmic management functions as a contemporary mechanism for surplus extraction, fragmenting labour into discrete tasks while obscuring relations of exploitation behind the language of flexibility and independence. Control is exercised indirectly, yet effectively, through ratings, incentives, and automated sanctions that encourage self-regulation and responsabilisation. Weberian insights further reveal gig work as an advanced form of rationalisation, where calculability and technical control replace bureaucratic supervision. However, unlike classical bureaucracy, platform governance lacks transparency and procedural safeguards, producing what can be described as a *"bureaucracy without offices."* This generates uncertainty and anxiety, as workers must constantly adapt to opaque and shifting algorithmic rules. A Foucauldian lens highlights how continuous surveillance and automated punishment create self-disciplining subjects, embedding power in everyday work practices rather than overt authority.

The concept of precarity helps connect these mechanisms to workers' lived experiences. While Standing's notion of the precariat captures the instability and insecurity of gig work, studies from India and the Global South show that platform precarity is layered onto older histories of informal labour. Gig work does not eliminate informality; it digitally reorganises and often intensifies it, producing a condition of formalised informality shaped by class, caste, migration, and urban inequality. Cultural mechanisms of

consent—such as entrepreneurial narratives and gamified incentives—further normalise algorithmic domination, limiting collective resistance.

Finally, the framework of surveillance capitalism highlights how data extraction itself becomes a central source of power and value, deepening precarity and dependence. Together, these perspectives underscore the need to move beyond narratives of flexibility toward critical questions of power, regulation, and social justice in the algorithmic age, particularly in contexts like India where legal protections remain partial and uneven.

Notes:

1. **Flexibilisation:** Labour flexibilisation is the shift towards adaptable employment practices, allowing companies to quickly adjust their workforce size, hours, and conditions to market changes, often through deregulation, temporary contracts, remote work, or outsourcing, aiming for competitiveness but frequently raising concerns about job security, worker rights, and increased inequality. It encompasses both internal (e.g., varied hours) and external (e.g., hiring/firing) changes, but is often linked to precarious work, reduced union power, and rising insecurity for workers.
2. **Responsibilisation:** According to sociologist Nikolas Rose, responsibilisation is a core mechanism of "advanced liberal" governance, where individuals are encouraged or required to become autonomous, self-governing subjects responsible for managing their own well-being and risks. This involves a shift of responsibility away from the state and onto individuals, families, and communities, often without a corresponding transfer of necessary resources or power.

References:

- Burawoy, M. (1979). *Manufacturing consent: Changes in the labour process under monopoly capitalism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Chakraborty, I., & Heeks, R. (2023). Gig worker response to algorithmic and other management practices in India: A study of drivers from ride-hailing platforms (Digital Development Working Paper No. 103). Manchester: Global Development Institute, University of Manchester.
- Retrieved from: <<https://hummedia.manchester.ac.uk/in>> Accessed on 25.1.26.
- Fairwork. (2024). *Fairwork India Ratings 2024: Labour standards in the platform economy*. Fairwork.
- Retrieved from: <<https://fair.work>> Accessed on 25/01/26.
- Foucault, M. (1977). *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison* (A. Sheridan, Trans.). New York: Pantheon Books.
- India Today*. (2026, January 15). Blinkit delivery boy reveals reality of 10-minute deadline stress to Raghav Chadha.
- Retrieved from:<<https://www.indiatoday.in/trending-news/story/blinkit-delivery-boy-reveals-reality-of-->>
Accessed on 24/01/26.
- India Today*. (2026, January 13). Pressure was real: Raghav Chadha hails end of 10-minute delivery branding.
- Retrieved from<<https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/aap-mp>> Accessed on 24/02/26.



International Labour Organization. (2021). *World Employment and Social Outlook 2021: The role of digital labour platforms in transforming the world of work*. Geneva: ILO.

Retrieved from: <<https://www.ilo.org>> Accessed on 25/01/26.

Kalra, A. (2026, January 14). Walmart's Flipkart, Swiggy drop 10-minute delivery claim in India. *Reuters*.

Retrieved from: <<https://www.reuters.com>> Accessed on 26/01/26.

Marx, K. (1976). *Capital: A critique of political economy* (Vol. 1; B. Fowkes, Trans.). London: Penguin Books. (Original work published 1867).

NDTV. (2025, December 27). Raghav Chadha Hosts Blinkit Delivery Rider For Lunch After Viral Low-Pay Clip.

Retrieved from: <<https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/raghav-chadha-hosts-blinkit-delivery-rider-for-lunch-after-viral-low-pay-clip-10010809>> Accessed on 24/01/26.

NDTV Profit. (2026, January 13). "Pressure is real, dangerous": Raghav Chadha hails government action to scrap 10-minute deliveries.

Retrieved from: <<https://www.ndtvprofit.com>> Accessed on 24/01/26.

NITI Aayog. (2022). *India's booming gig and platform economy: Perspectives and recommendations on the future of work*. New Delhi: Government of India.

Retrieved from: <<https://www.niti.gov.in>> Accessed on 24/01/26.

Rani, U., & Furrer, M. (2020). Digital labour platforms and new forms of flexible work in developing countries: Algorithmic management of work and workers. *Competition & Change*, 25(2), 212–236.

Retrieved from: <<https://doi.org/10.1177/1024529420905187>> (Original work published 2021) Accessed on 25/01/26.

Rosenblat, A., & Stark, L. (2016). Algorithmic labor and information asymmetries: A case study of Uber's drivers. *International Journal of Communication*, 10, 3758–3784.

Retrieved from: <<https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/4892>> Accessed on 25/02/26.

Rose, N. (1990). *Governing the soul: The shaping of the private self*. London: Routledge.

Rose, N. (1999). *Powers of freedom: Reframing political thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rose, N. (2000). Government and control. *British Journal of Criminology*, 40(2), 321–339.

Retrieved from: <<https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/40.2.321>> Accessed on 25/01/26.

Sehrawat, U., et al. (2021). Everyday HCI of Uber drivers in India: A developing country perspective. *Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction*, 5(CSCW1), 1–25.

Retrieved from: <<https://doi.org/10.1145/3479568>> Accessed on 26/01/26.

Standing, G. (2011). *The precariat: The new dangerous class*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Thaker, N. (2026, January 13). Drop 10-minute delivery promise: Govt tells quick-commerce platforms. *Forbes India*.

Retrieved from: <<https://www.forbesindia.com>> Accessed on 24/01/26.

The Economic Times. (2026, January 18). No more 10 minutes, but gig workers still race the clock.



Retrieved from: <<https://economictimes.indiatimes.co>> Accessed on 25/01/26.

The Code on Social Security, 2020, Act No. 36 of 2020 (India).

Retrieved from: <<https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/16823>> Accessed on 27/01/2026.

Weber, M. (1978). *Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology* (G. Roth & C. Wittich, Eds.). Berkeley: University of California Press.

Wiener, M., Mähring, M., Remus, U., & Saunders, C. (2023). Algorithmic control and gig workers: A legitimacy perspective of Uber drivers. *European Journal of Information Systems*, 32(3), 485–507.

Retrieved from: <<https://doi.org/10.1080/0960085X.2022.2157183>> Accessed on 25/01/26.

Wood, A. J. (2021). *Algorithmic management: Consequences for work organisation and working conditions* (JRC Working Papers on Labour, Education and Technology 2021-07). Seville, Spain: Joint Research Centre. Retrieved from: <<https://reshapingwork.net/dialogue/w>> Accessed on 25/01/26.

Wood, A. J., Graham, M., Lehdonvirta, V., & Hjorth, I. (2019). Good gig, bad gig: Autonomy and algorithmic control in the global gig economy. *Work, Employment and Society*, 33(1), 56–75.

Retrieved from: <<https://doi.org/10.1177/0950017018785616>> Accessed on 27/01/26.

Yasih, D. W. P. (2025). *Precarious workers in the gig economy: Neoliberalism and its discontents in Indonesia*. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.

Retrieved from: <<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-96-0278-0>> Accessed on 26/01/26.

Zuboff, S. (2019). *The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for a human future at the new frontier of power*. New York: Public Affairs.